Garfield was equally convinced of his own infallibility and, at times, given to siding with Washington behind Rosecrans's back whenever higher headquarters believed progress too slow.
Many of Garfield's staff officers were twenty-somethings who had served with Rosecrans in Mississippi without prior staff experience. Worst of all, their staff only functioned from noon to midnight, largely because the commander rarely arose before 10 a.m.; an arrangement that could not possibly have worked well in the field, even without the two hours of socializing that followed in the wee hours of the morning. Accordingly, Robertson argues with considerable traction that the consequent sleep deficit not only hindered staff work, but a micromanaging commander incapable of self-criticism.
That a lack of sleep may have caused Rosecrans to lose confidence in his own judgment when he was actually right is the most stinging of ironies. Early in the morning of 9 September, he heard of Chattanooga's evacuation and ordered an all-out pursuit of the Army of Tennessee, but at that point the picture blurs. We do know that Rosecrans met with George H. Thomas, whose XIV Corps was to play a key role in the upcoming push, but neither man left a record of the meeting. Robertson tentatively fills in the blank with a reference to the postwar account of XIV Corps Chaplain Thomas Van Horne. Van Horne was not present at that crucial meeting but later wrote a history of the Army of the Cumberland at Thomas's behest. According to Van Horne, Thomas recommended that Rosecrans consolidate his scattered army before attempting any pursuit and exploitation. Rosecrans agreed that the advice was sound but insisted on pursuit nevertheless because his superiors expected it. Robertson handles the Van Horne account carefully enough, noting that the more conservative course was in character for Thomas and that the War Department's tendency to needle Rosecrans is also an established fact. It is indeed likely that the Federals then forged ahead into un-reconnoitered territory because Rosecrans had at long last -and at the worst possible moment -caved in to pressure from Washington. While Lincoln famously held that Rosecrans seemed "confused and stunned like a duck hit on the head" in the wake of Chickamauga, the orders of 9 September mark the beginning of that downfall. will not: that generalship is all too often a game of bind man's bluff. In the end, we who celebrate history's successful gambles must also give credit to leaders who could tell a good bet from a bad one.
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